Reason vs. Reasons vs. Rationalization
In both of my current classes I have tried to emphasize the argument over the conclusion. Granted, there is an important degree of cultural literacy that comes from knowing what each philosophy said. After reading Plato, a student is in a much better position to figure out what is meant by Platonism next time it comes up, and that phrase seems to come up a lot. But that might just reflect the sorts of things that I tend to read.
By emphasizing the argument over the conclusion, I'm aiming to get students to evaluate the philosopher's writings based on the way in which the conclusion depends on the premises, independently of whether or not one believes in the conclusion. I think that this message began to get through in our discussion of David Hume's
On Miracles last night in "Intro to Philosophy". Many find the implied conclusion of the passage distressing, but the argument itself is compact and efficient.
The emphasis on reason giving is important for philosophy for at least two reasons:
1.
Sometimes,the strength of the argument is all there is in a philosophical discussion. What sets philosophy apart somewhat in this regard is that considering the method of argumentation is sometimes the entire story.
2.
If no reasons are given, then it's not philosophy. This is a cheap way to keep those impulse purchase books next the book store register from counting as philosophical. The analysis of how reasons are presented for accepting a conclusion is clearly not limited to philosophy. Every type of inquiry has its own methodology.
That is, "No philosophy involves not giving reasons", and "All non-reasoning activities are non-philosophical". Put that way, there's only really one reason, because these two formulations are logically equivalent (they're very close to being contrapositives of each other). This may seem like a small point, but I'm getting nervous about the different ways that I'm using the term "reason" in the paragraph.
Hume is also an interesting case because of his skepticism. Hume brings skepticism to new depths. This skepticism is a defining characteristic of Enlightenment philosophy, but its not the only one. Many have argued that the Enlightenment was also defined by a crippling dependences on reason over other forms of "knowing". In order to say this , one needs a substantial notion of Reason that is different than "the disciplined giving of reasons". But if there is a human faculty or substantial source of Reason, then the sorts of skepticism used by Descartes and Hume would tend to weaken other sources of knowledge by making them subject to Reason. Possible candidates for weakened knowledge sources include, but are not limited to: tradition, intuition, direct revelation and various varieties of perception that go beyond the Enlightenment theories of perception. If reason is only meant in the "thin sense" of "giving reasons", then its not clear what it would mean for a source of knowledge to be anything other than rational.
In case, it has been argued that the Enligtenment emphasis on Reason has had disastrous consequences.
I'll pursue these thoughts next time.
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